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ABSTRACT 
 The Internet of Things (IoT) is here and growing rapidly as 
consumers eagerly adopt internet-enabled devices for their utility, 
features, and convenience.  But this dramatic expansion also 
exacerbates two underlying dangers in the IoT.  First, hackers in 
the IoT may attempt to gain control of internet-enabled devices, 
causing negative consequences in the physical world.  Given that 
objects with internet connectivity range from household appliances 
and automobiles to major infrastructure components, this danger is 
potentially severe.  Indeed, in the last few years, hackers have 
gained control of cars, trains, and dams, and some experts think 
that even commercial airplanes could be at risk.  Second, IoT 
devices pose an enormous risk to the stability of the internet itself, 
as they are vulnerable to being hacked and recruited into botnets 
used for attacks on the digital world.  Recent attacks on major 
websites including Netflix and Twitter exemplify this danger.  This 
article surveys these dangers, summarizes some of their main 
causes, and then analyzes the extent to which current laws like the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act punish hacking in the IoT.  The 
article finds that although hacking in the IoT is likely illegal, the 
current legal regime punishes hacking after the fact and therefore 
lacks the prospective force needed to fully temper the risks posed 
by the IoT.  Therefore, other solutions are needed to address the 
perilousness of the IoT in its current form.  After a discussion of the 
practical and legal barriers to investigating and prosecuting 
hacking, we turn to the merits and pitfalls of hacking back from 
legal, practical, and ethical perspectives.  We then discuss the 
advantages and disadvantages of two possible solutions—
regulation and the standards approach.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 This is the age of the Internet of Things (IoT), where “everyday 
objects . . .  connect to the Internet and . . . send and receive data.”1  The 
lines between computers and humans have blurred as “[t]he Internet now 
affects the world in a direct physical manner.” 2  The Federal Trade 
Commission predicts that more than fifty billion devices will be part of 
the IoT by 2020,3 including items ranging from kitchen appliances to 
Fitbits and heart monitors.4  As Bruce Schneier explained to Congress, 
“everything is now a computer.”5 The reach of the IoT extends beyond 
consumer goods to major items and infrastructure components, including 
cars, airplanes,6 hospitals, telecommunications networks, and power 
grids.7  As a result, “insecurity” in the IoT “puts human safety at risk.”8  
Moreover, in the age of the IoT, the actions of “hackers” may carry 
physical consequences.9   
 This article proceeds as follows.  Section I describes episodes in 
which the IoT has already been hacked as well as the potential for other 
                                                     
1 FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/ 
federal-trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-
things-privacy/150127IOTrpt.pdf. 
2 Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks: Hearing 
Before H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (statement of 
Bruce Schneier), [hereinafter “Schneier”].  
3 Christina Scelsi, Care and Feeding of Privacy Policies and Keeping the Big Data 
Monster at Bay: Legal Concerns in Healthcare in the Age of the Internet of Things, 
39 NOVA L. REV. 391, 396 (2015). 
4 Andrew Meola, What is the Internet of Things (IoT)?, BUSINESS INSIDER, Dec. 19, 
2016, http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-the-internet-of-things-definition-
2016-8. 
5 Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks 
(preliminary transcript): Hearing Before H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
114th Cong. 27 (2016) (testimony of Bruce Schneier), http://docs.house.gov/ 
meetings/IF/IF17/20161116/105418/HHRG-114-IF17-Transcript-20161116.pdf 
[hereinafter “Schneier Testimony”]. At the time of his testimony, Schneier was 
identified as special advisor to IBM Security and CTO of Resilient: an IBM 
Company, a fellow of the Berkman-Klein Center at Harvard University, and a 
lecturer and fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. 
6 Id. at 29. 
7 Id. at 57. 
8 Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks: Hearing 
Before H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (statement of 
Kevin Fu), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20161116/105418/HHRG-114-
IF17-Wstate-FuK-20161116.pdf [hereinafter “Fu”] (warning the HECC that “the 
Dyn attack is a sign of worse pains to come”).   
9 See section I, infra. 
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attacks, and Section II examines the reasons for the vulnerabilities that 
facilitate hacking. Section III explores how criminal law now responds to 
attacks on the IoT, focusing on the applicability of the federal Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)10 to common forms of hacking IoT devices, 
and Section IV discusses the practical and legal barriers to investigation and 
prosecution of hacking.  Section V evaluates the merits and pitfalls of 
hacking back against botnets, from legal, practical, and ethical standpoints.  
Section VI briefly summarizes two other possibilities for securing the IoT, 
before the article provides a general summary in Section VII.  We conclude 
that solutions are urgently needed, despite the difficulty in crafting a fully 
satisfactory response. 
I. THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES 
A. How the IoT Has Been Hacked 
 On October 21, 2016, major websites, including Netflix, Twitter, 
Reddit, and the New York Times, were inaccessible for as long as several 
hours.11  The interruption was the result of a Distributed Denial of Service 
attack (“DDoS”)12 against the company Dyn, which “is one of many outfits 
that host the Domain Name System, or DNS, which functions as a 
switchboard for the internet.”13  The perpetrators of the Dyn attack 
exploited “a vulnerability in large numbers—possibly millions—of . . .  
devices like webcams and digital video recorders” and used them as a 
botnet14 to flood Dyn with traffic.15  This “attack traffic” combined with 
                                                     
10 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
11 Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Used New Weapons to Disrupt Major Websites Across 
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/22/business/ 
internet-problems-attack.html?_r=0. 
12 A DDoS is when “an attacker attempts to prevent legitimate users from accessing 
information or services. . . . [such as] when an attacker ‘floods’ a network with 
information. . . . The server can only process a certain number of requests at once, 
so if an attacker overloads the server with requests, it can't process [legitimate 
requests]. This is a ‘denial of service’ because you can't access that site.”  Mindi 
McDowell, Security Tip (ST04-015) Understanding Denial-of Service Attacks, US-
CERT, Feb. 6, 2013, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015.  
13 Perlroth, supra note 11. 
14 A botnet is a “collection of computers compromised by malicious code and 
controlled across a network.” Glossary, US-CERT, Jan. 11, 2017, https://niccs.us-
cert.gov/glossary#B.  Although they can be used for collaboration, “botnet” is a 
pejorative term.  Zach Lerner, Microsoft the Botnet Hunter: The Role of Public-
Private Partnerships in Mitigating Botnets, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 237, 237–38. 
(2014). 
15 Schneier, supra note 2, at 2. 
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“legitimate traffic” to overwhelm Dyn,16 taking down “dozens of websites” 
with it.17 
 Despite the large scale of the interruption, the Dyn attack has been 
characterized as “benign” since it did not result in physical injury or 
property damage.18  Nevertheless, it demonstrated the risk that the next 
attack may be devastating.19   
 In response to the Dyn attack, the House Energy and Commerce 
Committee (HECC) held a hearing to address the threats posed by hacking 
in the IoT.20  Expert testimony was grave.  Bruce Schneier warned that “the 
internet is now dangerous . . . .”21  Dr. Kevin Fu told the HECC that he 
“fear[s] for the day where every hospital system is down, for instance, 
because an [IoT] attack brings down the entire healthcare system.”22  Dale 
Drew cautioned that the culprits of the Dyn attack relied on “just a fraction 
of the total available compromised [IoT devices] . . . demonstrating the 
potential for significantly greater havoc . . . .”23 
 Illustrations of the dangers abound.  Many prominent examples of 
hacking in the IoT pertain to automobiles.24  In 2015, Fiat Chrysler recalled 
                                                     
16 Scott Hilton, Dyn Analysis Summary of Friday October 21 Attack, VANTAGE 
POINT, Oct. 26, 2016, http://dyn.com/blog/dyn-analysis-summary-of-friday-october 
-21-attack/. 
17 Schneier, supra note 2, at 2.  
18 Schneier, supra note 2, at 3. 
19 See Fu, supra note 8, at 2. 
20 Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks 
(preliminary transcript): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
114th Cong. 4–5 (2016) (statements of Greg P. Walden, Chairman, Subcomm. on 
Commc’n & Tech.), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20161116/105418/ 
HHRG-114-IF17-Transcript-20161116.pdf . 
21 Schneier Testimony, supra note 5, at 59. 
22 Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks 
(preliminary transcript): Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 
114th Cong. 43. (2016) (testimony of Kevin Fu), http://docs.house.gov/ 
meetings/IF/IF17/20161116/105418/HHRG-114-IF17-Transcript-20161116.pdf 
[hereinafter “Fu Testimony”]. 
23 Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 3 (2016) (statements 
of Dale Drew), http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20161116/105418/HHRG-
114-IF17-Wstate-DrewD-20161116.pdf [hereinafter “Drew”].  At the hearing, 
Drew was identified as senior vice president and chief security officer for Level 3 
Communications. 
24 Automobiles are an obvious target for hackers because they can cause physical 
damage, and because they are vulnerable. See Cheryl Dancey Balough & Richard 
C. Balough, Cyberterrorism on Wheels: Are Today's Cars Vulnerable to Attack?, 
BUS. L. TODAY, Nov. 2013, at 1 (“The potential exists that a car's computers, like 
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1.4 million cars in response to a widely publicized demonstration where 
hackers took control of a Jeep Cherokee through its infotainment system.25  
They were able to “turn the steering wheel, briefly disable the brakes and 
shut down the engine.”26  Additionally, in 2010, the disgruntled former 
employee of a used-car dealership remotely accessed the company’s 
computers and wreaked havoc by setting off car alarms and shutting down 
engines.27 
 The danger is not limited to cars.  For example, in 2008, a fourteen-
year-old boy hacked into the system controlling the trains of Lodz, Poland 
as a prank.28  He made several trains change tracks, causing multiple 
derailments and injuries.29  In 2013, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and 
the Department of Homeland Security “issued a warning” about “several . . 
. attacks against the 911 system.”30  The attacks were an attempt to extort 
money, and when the perpetrators received nothing they “launched [a] high 
volume of calls against the target network, tying up the system from 
receiving legitimate calls.”31  In 2016, Iranian hackers breached “the 
computer-guided controls” of the small Bowman Dam in suburban Rye 
                                                                                                                       
any computer system, can be hacked, leaving the car vulnerable to infection by 
malware. These vulnerabilities pose serious safety hazards should they be exploited 
nefariously. Legal implications of this technological vulnerability have yet to be 
adequately addressed.”).  Cars contain dozens of Electronic Control Units (ECUs) 
“embedded in the body, doors, dash, roof, trunk, seats, wheels, navigation 
equipment, and entertainment centers,” many of which connect to the internet and 
provide access points for hackers.  Id.  Disturbingly, “[t]he potential vulnerability 
of cars to hacking will increase as vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and self-driving cars 
become available” and “the average auto maker is about 20 years behind software 
companies in understanding how to prevent cyber attacks.”  Id. at 3.  
25 Kelly Pleskot, FCA Recalls 1.4 Million Vehicles over Hacking Concern, 
MOTORTREND, Jul. 24, 2015, http://www.motortrend.com/news/fca-recalls-1-4-
million-vehicles-over-hacking-concern/. 
26 Craig Timberg, Hacks on the Highway, WASHINGTON POST, Jul. 22, 2015, at 3, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/business/2015/07/22/hacks-on-the-
highway/?utm_term=.f074b322c45a.  
27 Id. at 7; Matthew Shaer, Disgruntled Hacker Remotely Disables 100 Cars, 
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 18, 2010, at 1, http://www.csmonitor.com/ 
Technology/Horizons/2010/0318/ Disgruntled-hacker-remotely-disables-100-cars. 
28 Graeme Baker, Schoolboy Hacks into City’s Tram System, THE TELEGRAPH, Jan. 
11, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1575293/Schoolboy-hacks-
into-citys-tram-system.html. 
29 Id.   
30 Kim Zetter, How America’s 911 Emergency Response System Can Be Hacked, 
WASHINGTON POST: THE SWITCH, Sept. 9, 2016, at 1, https://www.washington 
post.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/09/09/how-americas-911-emergency-response-
system-can-be-hacked/?utm_term=.9cfcc5fc5a3d.   
31 Id.  (internal citation omitted). 
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Brook, New York.32  The dam was offline for repair and immune to remote 
access, but the implications are disturbing because the hackers may have 
been trying to access an identically named dam in Oregon, which is a 
formidable “245 feet tall and 800 feet long . . . .”33 
B. Other Ways the IoT Could Be Hacked 
 Machine Security researchers have identified a range of other 
frightening vulnerabilities.  Researchers have “demonstrated ransomware 
against home thermostats and exposed vulnerabilities in implanted medical 
devices.  They’ve hacked voting machines and power plants.”34  Indeed, 
many computer security experts fear that the USB port at an airline seat 
could potentially be used to control the plane’s avionics.35   
 Clearly, the IoT offers a broad array of dangerous tools hackers can 
employ for a wide range of motives, including: terrorism,36 “national 
aggression,”37 pranking,38 election tampering,39 and monetary extortion.40  
Whatever the impetus for hacking in the IoT, the threats moving forward 
are considerable. 
                                                     
32 Joseph Berger, A Dam, Small and Unsung, Is Caught Up in an Iranian Hacking 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/nyregion/ 
rye-brook-dam-caught-in-computer-hacking-case.html?_r=0. 
33 Id.   
34 Schneier, supra note 2, at 5.  Although there is evidence of Russian hacking 
intended to affect the U.S. presidential election in 2016, these efforts seem to have 
been focused on the computers themselves and information contained on them (e.g., 
emails and donor databases), rather than on things connected to the computers, such 
as voting machines.  But see David Smith & John Swain, Russian Agents Hacked 
US Voting System Manufacturer Before U.S. Election, THE GUARDIAN, June 5, 
2017, at 1 (noting that although hacking and release of Democratic emails had been 
traced to Russia vote counting “was thought to be unaffected” before leaked report 
that Russian intelligence hacked into U.S. manufacturer of voting systems weeks 
before election). 
35 Schneier Testimony, supra note 5, at 102.   
36 See generally Balough, supra note 24, at 1 (theorizing about the possibility that 
cars might be exploited for terrorism through the internet). 
37 Schneier Testimony, supra note 5, at 57. 
38 See Baker, supra note 28 & 29, and accompanying text (chronicling a hacking 
attack executed as a prank). 
39 See generally Bruce Schneier, American Elections Will Be Hacked, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 9, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/opinion/american-elections-
will-be-hacked.html (summarizing the vulnerabilities of voting machines and 
infrastructure and the danger of election fraud).   
40 See Drew, supra note 23, at 3 (“The primary motivation for [DDoS] attacks 
appears to be financial”).   
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II. WHY IS THE IOT SO INSECURE AND VULNERABLE TO HACKING? 
 Security researchers have attributed the scale and ease of attack to 
“the quantity of insecure IoT devices operated by a highly distributed set of 
unwitting consumers,”41 and to a “fundamental market failure.”42  Because 
electronics consumers care most about affordability, “the market has 
prioritized features and cost over security.”43  Thus, the teams that make 
many IoT devices have less “security expertise” than major companies like 
Apple, because “the market won’t stand for the additional costs that [similar 
training] would require.”44  Further complicating matters, many IoT devices 
are part of a complex global supply chain where they are “designed and 
built offshore, then rebranded and resold.”45  The resulting devices are the 
product of differing international standards of security.46   
 As a result, IoT devices in the U.S. exhibit a wide range of serious 
vulnerabilities.  Many come with “default and easily-identifiable passwords 
that hackers can exploit.”47  Some of these passwords cannot be changed.48  
Similarly, many “devices also lack the capability of updating their 
firmware, forcing consumers to monitor for and install updates 
themselves.”49  Additionally, in many cases consumers have little or no way 
to know when their IoT devices have been compromised.50  The relationship 
between hardware and software further exacerbates the problem.  When the 
underlying software has been corrupted, the object itself often continues to 
function as intended, leaving little reason to replace it.51  Even devices used 
as part of a botnet in an attack will “still work fine.”52  Many objects 
                                                     
41 See Fu, supra note 8, at 4 (“What’s new is the scale and ease of attack because of 
the quantity of insecure IoT devices operated by a highly distributed set of 
unwitting consumers.”). 
42 Schneier, supra note 2, at 3. 
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Id.   
46 Dale Drew Committee on Energy and Commerce, Understanding the Role of 
Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks (preliminary transcript), Hearing, pp 
37–38 Nov 16, 2016. Available at: http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/ 
20161116/105418/HHRG-114-IF17-Transcript-20161116.pdf; Accessed: 2/26/17 
[hereinafter “Drew Testimony”] (explaining the need for international standards). 
47 Drew, supra note 23, at 2.   
48 Id.   
49 Id. 
50 Id.   
51 See Fu Testimony, supra note 22, at 88 (using the example of an MRI machine to 
explain that consumers do not want to replace functioning hardware to fix a 
problem with vulnerable software, especially where the machine is expensive). 
52 Schneier, supra note 2, at 4. 
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connected to the internet continue to serve the function for which 
consumers purchased them long after their software becomes insecure.53   
III. WHEN IS HACKING THE IOT A CRIME? 
 This section explores the interaction between the IoT and the 
current legal regime.  Subsection A discusses whether current laws prohibit 
hacking with an intent to control an object.  Subsection B explores the 
problem of botnets.  This section concludes that hacking in the IoT will 
often be illegal, though the existing laws punish conduct after the fact 
without addressing the vulnerabilities that facilitate hacking. 
A. Scenario One: Hacking with the Intention of Controlling an Object 
 Consider the following hypothetical.  Bill has a grudge against his 
neighbor Jeremy.  Bill discovers a security vulnerability in one of the many 
electronic control units (ECUs) of Jeremy’s late model sedan,54 and he 
hacks in through the internet and enters commands that enable him to take 
control of Jeremy’s car.55  
 Bill’s actions are increasingly plausible as cars become ever more 
connected and automakers struggle to update outmoded software.56  The 
hypothetical identifies a fundamental aspect of the IoT: the hackers’ target 
is not the computer, but the object connected to the computer.  This is true 
of many of the examples outlined above, though the motives varied: the 
fourteen-year-old hacked a train system for a prank; the Iranians hacked a 
dam apparently as an act of terrorism; the extortionists attacked the 911 
system for money; and the disgruntled employee hacked into cars sold by 
his former employer for revenge.  All sought to achieve their goals by 
controlling a remotely accessible object in the IoT.57  In the IoT, a major 
objective of remote access will be to control the “things.”  Thus, a key 
question is whether the current legal regime covers this relatively new 
threat, governing scenarios like the one involving Bill and Jeremy.  It does. 
                                                     
53 Id. at 3–4 (identifying the problem of longevity in internet enabled devices 
including cars, refrigerators, and thermostats). 
54 Such vulnerabilities are apparently not hard to track down.  See Timberg, supra 
note 26. 
 (“[S]ecurity researchers” discovered “readily accessible Internet links to thousands 
of other privately owned Jeeps, Dodges and Chryslers . . . .”). 
55 The exact form of hacking varies based on the specific ECU: “[s]ome entry 
points to a car’s ECUs require a direct hard-wired connection, while others can be 
accessed wirelessly, including Wi-Fi or [Radio-frequency identification].”  Balough 
supra note 24, at 1.  Researchers demonstrated that once a vehicle has been started 
normally, key functions including the engine, brakes, and transmission can be 
controlled remotely by “typing on a MacBook Pro.”  Timberg, supra note 26. 
56 Timberg, supra note 26. 
57 See supra text accompanying notes 27–33. 
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1. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
 The most obvious law that can be employed to combat hacking with 
the intent to control an object is the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(“CFAA”).  The CFAA was “[o]riginally designed as a criminal statute 
aimed at deterring and punishing hackers, particularly those who attack 
computers used for compelling federal interests,”58 but it also includes “a 
trespass-like civil remedy under federal law” for various forms of hacking.59  
It is logical that the law would cover hacking with an intent to control an 
object, as there is some evidence that Congress passed the CFAA in 
response to the movie WarGames,60 where the protagonist accidentally 
hacks into the computer controlling America’s nuclear weaponry and nearly 
starts a third world war.61 
 The provisions of the CFAA cover a range of conduct.  The Act 
prohibits: 
(1) unauthorized obtaining of national security information; (2) 
unauthorized obtaining of information from a financial institution, 
United States department or agency, or from any protected computer; 
(3) unauthorized access to government computers; (4) computer fraud; 
(5) computer damage; (6) passwords trafficking; and (7) computer 
extortion.62 
Section 1030(a)(5) is the subsection most likely to cover hacking with an 
intent to control an object.  It criminalizes: 
knowingly caus[ing] the transmission of a program, information, code, 
or command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally caus[ing] 
damage without authorization, to a protected computer; intentionally 
access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, and as a result 
of such conduct, recklessly caus[ing] damage; or intentionally 
                                                     
58 COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT, SS032 ALI-ABA 993, 995. 
59 5.06. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 1 E-Commerce and Internet Law 5.06 
(2016 update). 
60 See Fred Kaplan, ‘WarGames’ and Cybersecurity’s Debt to a Hollywood Hack, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2016, at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/21/movies/ 
wargames-and-cybersecuritys-debt-to-a-hollywood-hack.html?_r=0 (chronicling 
the emergence of early federal cybersecurity laws in response to President Ronald 
Reagan’s concern over the movie “WarGames”); Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, 
Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 429, 492 (2012). 
61 For a synopsis of the movie WarGames, see WarGames, IMDB, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0086567/plotsummary?ref_=tt_stry_pl#synopsis (last 
visited August 31, 2017). 
62 Ioana Vasiu & Lucian Vasiu, Break on Through: An Analysis of Computer 
Damage Cases, 14 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. POL'Y 158, 163 (2014). 
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access[ing] a protected computer without authorization, and as a result 
of such conduct, caus[ing] damage and loss.63 
Whether §1030(a)(5) prohibits hacking with an intent to control hinges on 
four key definitions: (1) “transmission,” (2) “computer,” (3) “protected 
computer,” and (4) “damage.”  
 “Transmission” encompasses a range of hacking activities, such as 
“[t]he transfer of operation or confidential information,” “malicious 
software updates,” “code injection attacks,” DDoS, and the “embedding of 
malicious code” or malware.64  Under the CFAA, transmission “can be 
accomplished either over the Internet or through a physical medium such as 
a compact disc.”65  This would cover many forms of hacking aimed at 
controlling an object.  To return to the example of Bill and Jeremy, Bill’s 
conduct qualifies, as he transmitted commands via the internet to take 
control of Jeremy’s car. 
 Within the CFAA, “computer” is an expansive term. It is defined as 
“an electronic, magnetic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data 
processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and 
includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related 
to or operating in conjunction with such device . . . .”66  As Judge 
Easterbrook explained, the definition of “computer” in the CFAA is an 
example where the exclusions from the definition “show just how general” 
that definition is.67  Indeed, CFAA subsection (e)(1) “carves out automatic 
typewriters, typesetters, and handheld calculators; this shows that other 
devices with embedded processors and software are covered.”68  Thus, most 
IoT devices are computers for purposes of the CFAA.  The ECUs that Bill 
hacked in Jeremy’s car certainly would qualify, as they “are high speed data 
processing devices performing logical, arithmetic, or storage functions.”69 
 Many IoT devices are also protected computers.  The CFAA 
defines protected computers as not only those “exclusively for the use of a 
financial institution or the United States Government” but also computers 
that are “used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or 
communication . . . .”70 Courts have interpreted this definition broadly.  
Indeed, in U.S. v. Mitra, Judge Easterbrook explained:  
                                                     
63 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2012). 
64 Vasiu, supra note 62, at 167–169. 
65 174 A.L.R. Fed. 101 (Originally published in 2001). 
66 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(1) (2012). 
67 United States v. Mitra, 405 F.3d 492, 495 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original). 
68 Id. 
69 Balough supra note 24, at 3. 
70 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (e)(2)(b) (2012). 
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[T]he statute . . . protects computers (and computerized 
communication systems) used in such commerce, no matter how the 
harm is inflicted.  Once the computer is used in interstate commerce, 
Congress has the power to protect it from a local hammer blow, or 
from a local data packet that sends it haywire.71   
This standard included the afflicted computer in Mitra—Madison, 
Wisconsin’s “computer-based radio system for police, fire, ambulance, and 
other emergency communications”72—even though the hacker’s 
“interference did not affect any radio system on the other side of a state 
line.”73  What mattered was that Madison’s computerized radio system 
“operated on spectrum licensed by the FCC” and therefore implicated 
interstate commerce.74 
 Mitra is not an exception.  Particularly relevant for devices that are 
part of the IoT, “[c]ourts generally hold that because the Internet and 
interstate commerce are inexorably intertwined, any computer connected to 
the Internet should be considered a computer affecting interstate commerce 
and therefore protected.”75  Thus, if Jeremy’s ECU is internet-enabled, it is 
a protected computer under the CFAA.  This seems a safe bet in an era 
where cars are increasingly connected and can “talk to the outside world 
through remote key systems, satellite radios, telematic control units, 
Bluetooth connections, dashboard internet links and even wireless tire-
pressure monitors.”76 
 “Damage” is “defined as ‘any impairment to the integrity or 
availability of data, a program, a system, or information,’”77 and almost 
certainly encompasses hacking with the intent of controlling an object.78  To 
begin with, a hacker damages a computer under the statute by forcing it to 
behave in a manner not intended by its owner.79  Additionally, “[a]dverse 
                                                     
71 Mitra, 405 F.3d at 496. 
72 Id. at 493. 
73 Id. at 496. 
74 Id. 
75 Vasiu, supra note 62, at 164. 
76 Timberg, supra note 26. 
77 Jeffrey K. Gurney, Driving into the Unknown: Examining the Crossroads of 
Criminal Law and Autonomous Vehicles, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 393, 439 
(2015) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2012)).” 
78 As one commentator has summarized it, “nearly any instance of unauthorized 
hacking could be said to impair the integrity of a computer system.”  Ric Simmons, 
The Failure of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Time to Take an Administrative 
Approach to Regulating Computer Crime, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1703, 1712 
(2016). 
79 See Vasiu, supra note 62, at 160 (“Integrity generally refers to maintaining 
computer data in a protected state, unaltered by improper, unauthorized or 
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actions . . .  that alter, encrypt, encipher, encode, transmit or delete data or 
exhaust system resources” all are damage under the CFAA because they 
impair the availability of the computer by making it unusable and 
inaccessible.80  Transmission is damage under the CFAA because it 
frequently “involves the deletion of computer data or files.”81  Clearly, Bill 
damaged Jeremy’s car under the CFAA, since he caused it to behave 
contrary to the wishes of its owner.   
 Finally, CFAA penalties are structured in a manner that enhances 
punishment depending on the outcome of the hacking.  The Act provides 
harsher penalties for those whose hacking causes “physical injury,” “a 
threat to public health or safety,” “damage affecting a computer used by or 
for an entity of the United States government in furtherance of justice, 
national defense, or national security,” damage to at least ten computers 
within a year, or “modification or impairment . . . of the medical 
examination, diagnosis, treatment, or care of 1 or more individuals . . . .”82  
Unsurprisingly, the stiffest retribution is reserved for those who “knowingly 
or recklessly caus[e] death from conduct in violation of” subsection 
(a)(5)(a).83  Depending on the nature and results of Bill’s hacking, he may 
be subject to some of these increased CFAA penalties.  For example, if he 
took control of Jeremy’s car while it was hurtling down a busy highway, it 
is easy to imagine how Bill might have threatened public safety.  If 
Jeremy’s car crashed as a result of the hacking, Bill would face steeper 
sentencing under the CFAA if Jeremy were injured or killed. 
 There are many other laws that could govern hacking with an intent 
to control an object.    These include state laws similar to the CFAA.84  
                                                                                                                       
subversive conduct or acts contrary to what the system owner or privilege grantor 
intended.”).  
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 192. 
82 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4) (2012). 
83 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(4)(F) (2012). 
84 Computer Crime Law, 29 (noting all “fifty states . . . enact[ed] statutes 
specifically prohibiting computer misuse”).  Like the CFAA, all of these laws 
employ the “common building block of unauthorized access to a computer,” which 
is “usually supplemented by other elements to create additional criminal 
prohibitions, such as statutes preventing . . . computer damage.” Id. at 29–30.  
Many of these laws could be construed as anti-hacking statutes. Gurney, supra note 
77, at 434.  And some state computer crime laws prohibit damaging the object for 
which control is sought, or other property. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-451(b) 
(criminalizing “use [of] a computer or computer network without authority and 
with the intent to: … (5) Cause physical injury to the property of another . . . .”).  
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B. Scenario Two: Botnets 
 As discussed in Section I, a botnet is a network of compromised 
computers, “often programmed to complete a set of repetitive tasks” 
without “the owner's knowledge or permission.”85  Botnets “are the 
instrumentality through which substantial amounts of cybercrime takes 
place.”86  Botnet-based cybercrime includes spam, fraud, and—of particular 
relevance for the IoT—DDoS and the installation of malware.87  Hackers 
used a botnet in the Dyn attack, which prompted the HECC hearing 
(discussed in Section I) about the dangers of hacking in the IoT.88   
 By their nature, botnets are illegal under the CFAA.89  For example, 
CFAA section 1030(a)(5) criminalizes “knowingly caus[ing] the 
transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and as a result 
of such conduct, intentionally caus[ing] damage without authorization, to a 
protected computer . . . .”90  Botnets are often created through malicious 
software that behaves in this manner.91  Although combating botnets with 
laws like the CFAA poses many practical problems,92 there have been some 
successful prosecutions.93 
IV. PRACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES IN BRINGING CFAA 
PROSECUTIONS 
 Although the CFAA is broad enough to reach the hacking in 
scenarios one and two, any investigation and prosecution would confront 
significant practical and procedural issues—issues that are common to 
nearly all computer hacking prosecutions, and not limited to those involving 
                                                     
85 Lerner, supra note 14, at 237–38. 
86 Zachary K. Goldman & Damon McCoy, Deterring Financially Motivated 
Cybercrime, 8 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 595, 608 (2016). 
87 Lerner, supra note 14, at 237–38. 
88 See text accompanying notes 11-23 supra; Bruce Schneier, Lessons From the 
Dyn DDoS Attack, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (November 8, 2016, 6:25 AM), 
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2016/11/lessons_from_th_5.html.  
89 See Kesan supra note 60 at 493 (“The CFAA's language is very broad and can be 
read to prohibit the creation of botnets.”). 
90 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5) (2012). 
91 See Kesan, supra note 60 at 442–444 (explaining how botnets are created). 
92 See Lerner, supra note 14, at 244 (“CFAA enforcement requires precise 
knowledge of the defendant's identity, which is often impossible to obtain in DDoS 
attacks . . .  [In addition] CFAA prosecution of DDoS masters in foreign countries 
is impeded by a number of jurisdictional obstacles.”). 
93 See, e.g, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Arizona Man Sentenced 
to 30 Months in Prison for Selling Access to Botnets, JUSTICE NEWS (Sept. 15, 
2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/arizona-man-sentenced-30-months-prison-
selling-access-botnets (describing successful prosecution of a man who had sold 
“access to and use of thousands of malware-infected computers”). 
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the IoT.  First, attribution is very difficult.  It poses technical problems and 
often requires remote electronic searches.  The Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure were amended in 2016 to remove some procedural barriers to 
remote electronic searches.  But the amendments—and remote searches in 
general—have been controversial.  As we discuss in more detail below in 
subsection B, Critics have voiced a variety of concerns, including Fourth 
Amendment and privacy objections.  These issues will likely be raised in 
prosecutions that rely on evidence secured by means of remote electronic 
searches, and there are ongoing efforts to repeal the amendments.  
Moreover, when IoT hacking originates outside the United States, those 
prosecutions will raise the question whether the CFAA provides for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction.  Despite all of these difficulties, there have been 
some successful investigations, allowing the government to prosecute 
hackers and neutralize their botnets.94 
A. Attribution 
 Reliable attribution of most forms of computer hacking is extremely 
difficult.95  As Professor Orin Kerr explained, investigating computer 
crimes is necessarily different than investigating traditional physical 
offenses: 
With the physical crime, the chances were good that the crime scene 
would yield substantial leads. Even if no one could identify [the 
perpetrator] in a lineup, his physical presence at the crime scene 
greatly narrowed the number of suspects. The electronic crime scene 
looks very different. In most cases, evidence gathered at the victim site 
will tell the investigator only that someone, located somewhere in the 
world, hacked into the [victim’s computer]. In most cases, the biggest 
investigative lead comes in the form of an originating Internet Protocol 
(IP) address recorded by the [victim’s] servers. An IP address is the 
internet equivalent of a telephone number . . . .96 
                                                     
94 One such success is described in the text accompanying nn.179–88, infra.  The 
indictment and extradition of Fabio Gasperini, an Italian citizen changed with 
creating and running a global botnet, is another.  Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, E.D.N.Y., Cybercriminal Who Created Global Botnet Infected with 
Malicious Software Extradited to Face Click Fraud Charges (Apr. 21, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/cybercriminal-who-created-global-botnet-
infected-malicious-software-extradited-face. 
95 See Paul N. Stockton & Michele Golabek-Goldman, Prosecuting 
Cyberterrorists: Applying Traditional Jurisdictional Frameworks to a Modern 
Threat, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 211, 214–15 (2014) (noting the technical 
difficulty of attribution). 
96 Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. 
REV. 279, 284 (2005).  See also Susan W. Brenner, Law, Dissonance, and Remote 
Computer Searches, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 43, 46 (2012) (comparing the cybercrime 
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Because hackers typically route their attacks through a series of 
intermediaries, investigators must “try to follow the trail of electronic bread 
crumbs” back to the perpetrator’s computer, a cumbersome process.97  
Moreover, hackers intentionally target intermediary computers with lax 
security and poor record keeping, meaning that the trail is likely to break 
down.98  When that occurs, investigators must use other techniques, such as 
prospective surveillance.99   
 These difficulties are compounded in cases involving multiple 
computers.  Attribution is especially difficult in the case of cross-
jurisdictional botnet cases, which may involve one million or more 
computers from many nations.100  The perpetrator may be an individual, but 
it may also be a business entity or a foreign government agency.101  The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, other U.S. government agencies, and 
private organizations are attempting to improve their capacity to meet these 
challenges.102  In some cases, the government has collaborated with the 
private sector.103 
 Anonymizing technology adds another layer to this already 
complicated attribution problem.  For example, Tor is a private global 
computer network that allows users to conduct anonymous transactions 
without revealing their location.104  As one commentator explained: 
Computers on the Tor Network use an encrypted communications 
protocol that cannot be accessed using normal web browsers. Instead, 
they require the use of special software, like the Tor Browser. Proper 
use of the Tor Network makes it practically impossible for 
                                                                                                                       
investigations with traditional investigations and noting that a computer hacker may 
be hundreds or even thousands of miles away from the victim, unseen by and 
unknown to him or her).  
97 Kerr, supra note 96, at 285. 
98 Id. at 286. 
99 Id.  
100 E.g., Stockton & Golabek-Goldman, supra note 95, at 214 (describing DDOS 
attack on Estonia involving one million slave computers in countries from Vietnam 
to the United States). 
101 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr & Sean D. Murphy, Government Hacking to Light the 
Dark Web: What Risks to International Relations and International Law, 70 STAN. 
L. REV. ONLINE 58, 58 (describing hacking by Russian, Chinese, and North Korean 
governments). 
102 Id. at 214–15. 
103 See Garrett M. Graff, How the FBI Took Down Russia’s Spam King—and His 
Massive Botnet, WIRED, April 11, 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/04/fbi-took-
russias-spam-king-massive-botnet/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2017) (describing outside 
security researchers and FBI agents). 
104 Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction 
on the Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1087 (2017). 
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governments to trace the location of computers hosting “hidden” 
websites on the network, the location of computers accessing those 
hidden websites, or the location of computers that tunnel through the 
network to “anonymously” visit public websites on the World Wide 
Web.105 
Tor bounces message packets through a series of intermediate computers 
(proxies) scattered around the globe, making it impossible for government 
investigators to determine the location of the original sender.106 
B. Remote Electronic Searches 
 When a physical search is not possible because anonymizing 
technology has hidden the location of electronic storage media, the 
government may be able to conduct a remote electronic search of the media 
to seize or copy electronically stored information.  Although searches of this 
nature are a common feature of hacking investigations, they raise a variety 
of ethical and legal issues.  Some of the issues were addressed in 2016 by 
amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  These 
amendments generated substantial controversy, and the constitutional issues 
raised by critics of remote searches will need to be resolved on a case-by-
case basis when warrant applications are presented for judicial approval or 
evidence obtained by the use of such warrants is introduced at trial.  And 
some commentators have urged Congress to limit remote electronic 
searches. 
 Remote electronic searches employ network investigative 
techniques (NITs) that allow investigators to reach a computer without 
knowledge of its physical location.107  A remote search requires only a 
means of communicating with the target computer, such as an active email 
address.108  For example, an NIT may be an email containing software that 
can extract from the target computer and relay back information such as the 
target computer’s IP address, its host name, media access control (MAC) 
address, time zone, and registered computer name, registered company 
name, and current logged-in user name.109  The government has employed 
                                                     
105 Id. (footnote omitted). 
106 Id. at 1088. 
107 Id. at 1096.  For a description of the NIT, see United States v. Croghan, 209 
F.Supp.3d 1080, 1084 (S.D. Iowa 2016).  For a general description of NITs, see 
Devin M. Adams, The 2016 Amendments to Criminal Rule 41: National Search 
Warrants to Seize Cyberspace, “Particularly” Speaking, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 727, 
737–41 (2017). 
108 Id.  
109 See, e.g., Memorandum from Jonathan J. Wroblewski to Judge John F. Keenan, 
Chair, Subcommittee on Rule 41, Jan. 17, 2014, Attachment B, April 2014 Agenda 
Book Advisory Comm. Crim. Rules 179, 187, available at 
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other NITs as well.110  Although the lower courts have been divided on this 
issue, several courts have concluded that NITs constitute searches for the 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment when the government obtains 
information (such as the defendant's IP address) not from a third party 
provider, but rather from an intrusion into the defendant's computer.111 
 In 2014, the Department of Justice recommended that the Judicial 
Conference Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules amend the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure to “update the provisions relating to the 
territorial limits for searches of electronic storage media.”112  The 
Department sought amendments to deal with “two increasingly common 
situations (1) where the warrant sufficiently describes the computer to be 
searched but the district within which that computer is located is unknown, 
and (2) where the investigation requires law enforcement to coordinate 
searches of numerous computers in numerous districts.”113 Additionally, the 
Department noted that the provisions for notice following a search had not 
been adapted to address remote searches.114 
 The Department explained that when persons committing criminal 
offenses have used anonymizing technology, like Tor, the territorial limits 
of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 could prevent the issuance of 
warrants for remote searches although the government had met all of the 
                                                                                                                       
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-
rules-criminal-procedure-november-2014. 
110 For example, after the government seized the server for the “Playpen” child 
pornography website, it obtained a warrant to install an NIT on the server 
consisting of software to be deployed when any user logged into the site with a 
username and password, regardless of the user’s physical location. The NIT would 
then force the “activating” computer to transmit information back to the FBI, 
including: the IP address of the activating computer; the date and time the NIT 
determined the IP address; a unique identifier generated by the NIT to distinguish 
data from different activating computers; the type of operating system running on 
the activating computer, including type, version, and architecture; information on 
whether the NIT had already been delivered to the activating computer; the “host 
name” of the activating computer; the operating system used by the activating 
computer; and the Media Access Control (“MAC”) address of the activating 
computer.  
111 E.g., United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1047 (8th Cir. 2017); Adams, 
supra note 107, at 755–57 (collecting cases). 
112 Letter from Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General, to The 
Honorable Reena Raggi, Chair, Advisory Committee on the Criminal Rules 1 (Sept. 
18, 2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/suggestions/hon-
mythili-raman-13-cr-b [hereinafter Raman letter]. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 4. 
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other constitutional and statutory requirements.  With certain exceptions,115 
prior to the 2016 amendment Rule 41 authorized “a magistrate judge with 
authority in a district” to issue warrants to search for and seize “property 
located within the district.”116  But anonymizing technology like Tor 
disguises the location of the storage media or information to be searched.  
Thus under a strict reading of the rule, disguising the district in which the 
computer was located precluded any court from issuing a warrant, even if 
the government had presented probable cause and met all of the other 
statutory and constitutional requirements for the issuance of a warrant.117  
The government would be unable to obtain venue in any district, regardless 
of the seriousness of the offense.118 
 The venue or territorial limitation for the issuance of warrants also 
imposed a particularly heavy burden in botnet investigations, where the 
affected computers (and other IoT devices that would be classed as 
computers under the CFAA) are often located in all ninety-four federal 
districts.  Although the information establishing probable cause would be 
virtually identical in each district, presenting this information in each 
                                                     
115 Before amendment, Rule 41(b) authorized search warrants for property located 
outside the judge’s district in only four situations: (1) for property in the district that 
might be removed before execution of the warrant; (2) for tracking devices installed 
in the district, which may be monitored outside the district; (3) for investigations of 
domestic or international terrorism; and (4) for property located in a U.S. territory 
or a U.S. diplomatic or consular mission.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(2)-(5). 
116 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1). 
117 Raman letter at 2, citing In re Warrant to Search a Target Computer at Premises 
Unknown, 958 F. Supp. 2d 753, 761 (S.D. Tex. 2013).   
118 For example, in describing the need for the Rule 41 amendments, Assistant 
Attorney General Leslie Caldwell wrote of the dismissal of prosecutions of users of 
the Playpen site, which allowed pedophiles to trade images and videos of child sex 
exploitation: 
Despite being prepared to comply fully with the Fourth Amendment’s 
warrant requirements, including persuading a federal judge that a lawful 
basis for a warrant exists, investigators are being told that, because 
criminals have successfully used technology to hide their location, there is 
no court available to hear their warrant application.  Unless that 
nonsensical outcome is addressed, cases such as Playpen fail, meaning 
that pedophiles – including hands-on abusers – will be free to continue 
their crimes. 
Leslie R. Caldwell, Ensuring Tech-Savy Criminals Do Not Have Immunity from 
Investigation, U.S. Dept’t Justice (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ 
archives/opa/blog/ensuring-tech-savvy-criminals-do-not-have-immunity-
investigation. 
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district would impose a heavy burden both on the investigators seeking the 
warrants and on the courts reviewing those warrants in each district.119 
 Finally, before amendment, the notice provisions of Rule 41 were 
ill-adapted to remote electronic searches.120  The rule required the officer 
executing the warrant to give a copy of the warrant and receipt for any 
property seized “to the person from whom, or from whose premises, the 
property was taken or leave a copy of the warrant or receipt at the place 
where the officer took the property.”121  This language seemed to 
contemplate leaving the warrant and receipt at a physical place, which 
would not be feasible for remote electronic searches. 
 After a period of notice and comment on proposed revisions,122 and 
a public hearing123 on draft amendments, the Advisory Committee proposed 
amendments to Rule 41 that addressed the problems with venue and made 
explicit provision for the notice to be provided after remote electronic 
searches.124  When “technological means,” such as Tor, had been used to 
conceal the location of the media or information, the proposed amendment 
authorized the issuance of a warrant by “a magistrate judge with authority in 
any district where activities related to the crime may have occurred.”125  
Additionally, in CFAA investigations under 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5), such as 
botnet investigations, the amendment authorized the government to seek a 
single warrant when protected computers had been damaged in five or more 
districts.126  Finally, the amendment added a new provision regarding notice 
for remote electronic searches, which required the officer conducting the 
search to “make reasonable efforts to serve a copy of the warrant and 
receipt on the person whose property was searched or who possessed the 
information that was seized or copied.”127  It also allowed service to be 
                                                     
119 Raman letter at 2–3. 
120 Id. at 3. 
121 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C). 
122 See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (posted 
Aug. 14, 2015) (providing proposed amendments and seeking comments between 
August 15, 2014 and February 17, 2015) https://www.regulations.gov/docket? 
D=USC-RULES-CR-2014-0004.   
123 See Transcript of Proceedings, Judicial Conf. Advisory Comm. on Crim. Rules, 
Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Crim. Proc., Wash., 
D.C., Nov. 5, 2014, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/records-
and-archives-rules-committees/transcripts-and-testimony. 
124 Comm. on the Rules of Practice and Procedure, Report of the Advisory Comm. 
on Criminal Rules, (May 6, 2015), in Final Materials for Congress 23, 24 
[hereinafter Final Materials for Congress], http://www.uscourts.gov/file/ 
document/2016-04-28-final-package-congress. 
125 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(A). 
126 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6)(B). 
127 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(f)(1)(C). 
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“accomplished by any means, including electronic means, reasonably 
calculated to reach that person.”128 
 After review by the Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure, 
the Judicial Conference, and the Supreme Court, the proposed amendments 
were submitted to Congress,129 which took no action and allowed them to 
go into effect December 1, 2016.130 
 The amendments have generated substantial opposition.  Although 
a variety of other concerns were also raised during the public notice and 
comment period,131 “[t]he most common theme in the comments opposing 
the amendments was a concern that they relaxed or undercut the protections 
for personal privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”132  Critics 
expressed concern that warrants issued pursuant to the proposed rules would 
not meet the particularity and notice requirements, would be exceptionally 
intrusive, destructive, and dangerous, and yet largely insulated from judicial 
review.133  Several commentators urged that changes of this nature were not 
appropriate for rulemaking because they raised policy issues that should be 
resolved by Congress.134  Finally, some commentators also urged that the 
amendments would improperly allow extraterritorial searches in violation of 
                                                     
128 Id.  
129 See Final Materials for Congress at 201-249 (providing Chief Justice John 
Roberts’ transmittals of proposed amendments to Rule 41 to Congress, Judicial 
Conference’s transmittal of amendments to the Supreme Court, and excerpts from 
the Report of the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules to the Standing 
Committee on Practice and Procedure).  
130 See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 114TH CONG., 2D SESSION, FEDERAL 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: RULE 41 (Comm. Print 2016). 
131 For summaries of the comments, see Adams, supra note 107, at 746–48 (noting 
opponents portrayed amendment as “a substantive expansion on the government's 
investigative authority, which raised a number of emphatic constitutional, legal, and 
geopolitical concerns”); Sara Sun Beale & Nancy King, Reporters, Memo to the 
Members, Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Feb. 25, 2015, at 4–18, in 
Agenda Book, Advisory Comm. on Crim. Rules, March 16-17, 2015, at 87, 90-104, 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory 
-committee-rules-criminal-procedure-may-2015 (describing concerns about (1) the 
Fourth Amendment, (2) the effect on the use of virtual private networks (VPNs) 
and anonymizing technology, (3) forum shopping, (4) tension or conflict with the 
Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Title III), (5) extraterritorial searches, (6) the 
potential for collateral damage, (7) searches of victim computers, and (8) intrusions 
into the constitutional and statutory rights of the media). 
132 Id. at 4. 
133 Id. at 4–10. 
134 Id. at 15. 
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international law.135  Similar concerns were later raised by Senator Ron 
Wyden and several other members of Congress.136 
 The Advisory Committee concluded that these constitutional and 
policy arguments raised substantive issues that were not germane to its task 
under the Rules Enabling Act,137 and should be resolved by the courts on a 
case-by-case basis, or by Congress.  The Department of Justice had brought 
to the Committee’s attention a procedural problem that was impairing its 
ability to investigate serious computer crimes.  In the Committee’s view, its 
task was to remove a barrier created by the Rules (not the Constitution), and 
to allow the courts to rule on constitutional issues if (and when) they were 
raised by particular warrant applications.138  The amendment would 
facilitate judicial review and the development of applicable constitutional 
standards by allowing the government to seek warrants, rather than 
conducting exigent warrantless searches.139  Broad policy questions—such 
as whether additional non-constitutional limitations should be imposed on 
                                                     
135 Id. at 13–15. 
136 See Markus Rauschecker, Rule 41 Amendments Provide for a Drastic Expansion 
of Government Authority to Conduct Computer Searches and Should Not Have 
Been Adopted by the Supreme Court, 76 MD. L. REV. 1085, 1091–92 (2017) 
(describing congressional opposition). 
137 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).  
138 See HONORABLE REENA RAGGI, ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, 13–14 
(2015) [hereinafter Committee Report] (explaining Committee’s view that “Venue 
is not substance.  Venue is process, and the Rules Enabling Act tells the judiciary to 
promulgate rules of practice and procedure, not to wait for Congress to act,” and 
expressing the Committee’s confidence “judges will address Fourth Amendment 
requirements on a case-by-case basis both in issuing warrants under these 
amendments and in reviewing them when challenges are made thereafter.”); 
ADVISORY COMM. ON CRIMINAL RULES, Minutes from Meeting on March 16-17, 
2015 in Orlando, Florida, 3–8 (2015) [hereinafter Minutes] (statements by Rule 41 
Subcommittee chair and members characterizing many of the objections to the 
amendments as substantive, not procedural, noting Committee’s responsibility 
under the Rules Enabling Act to address new procedural problem (such as the 
venue gap), and observing that providing venue for warrant applications would 
allow caselaw on the constitutional issues to develop in an orderly fashion, 
shedding light on the issues should Congress wish to legislate). The Advisory 
Committee addressed this point in the Committee Note, which provides: 
The amendment does not address constitutional questions, such as the 
specificity of description that the Fourth Amendment may require in a 
warrant for remotely searching electronic storage media or seizing or 
copying electronically stored information, leaving the application of this 
and other constitutional standards to ongoing case law development. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6), 2016 Committee Note. 
139 Minutes at 5 (comments of Judge Raggi and Judge Kethledge), 6 (comments of 
Judge Sutton). 
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remote searches to protect privacy—are substantive, not procedural, and 
accordingly they would fall outside the rulemaking authority conferred by 
the Rules Enabling Act.  Congress would be the appropriate body to weigh 
the competing policy concerns and consider whether legislation should be 
enacted.140  Finally, the Committee was not persuaded by the argument that 
the amendment would authorize the courts to issue extraterritorial searches 
in violation of international law.141 
 Post-amendment scholarship has renewed and developed more fully 
the Fourth Amendment issues,142 and produced a debate about whether Rule 
41 authorizes searches that raise foreign relations and international law 
concerns.  One recent article argued that searches authorized by the 
amendments to Rule 41 violate other nations’ sovereignty, which offends 
customary international law and disrupts foreign relations.143  But other 
                                                     
140 See Committee Report at 13–14 (noting that many of the objections to the 
proposed amendments “were about substantive limits on government searches, 
which are not affected by the proposed amendment”); Minutes at 3, 5 (comments of 
Judge Kethledge) (subcommittee chair’s characterization of many objections to the 
amendments as substantive, not procedural), 6 (comments of Judge Sutton) (noting 
that approving venue for searches was not approving remote electronic searches; 
rather, it permits litigation “that will shed light on the process and the issues,” and 
noting that under the Rules Enabling Act the judiciary’s role is to promulgate rules, 
to which Congress reacts). 
141 See Raman letter at 4–5 (citations omitted), stating: 
In light of the presumption against international extraterritorial 
application, and consistent with the existing language of Rule 41(b)(3), 
this amendment does not purport to authorize courts to issue warrants that 
authorize the search of electronic storage media located in a foreign 
country or countries. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches 
of the property of non-United States persons outside the United States, 
and the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement does not apply to 
searches of United States persons outside the United States. Instead, 
extraterritorial searches of United States persons are subject to the Fourth 
Amendment's "basic requirement of reasonableness." Under this proposed 
amendment, law enforcement could seek a warrant either where the 
electronic media to be searched are within the United States or where the 
location of the electronic media is unknown. In the latter case, should the 
media searched prove to be outside the United States, the warrant would 
have no extraterritorial effect, but the existence of the warrant would 
support the reasonableness of the search. 
142 See Rauschecker, supra note 136, at 1095–1100  (arguing that the amendment 
allows searches that will violate the Fourth Amendment and greatly expand the 
government’s investigative authority); Adams, supra note 107, at 753–72 
(proposing a Fourth Amendment framework for courts considering remote access 
warrants). 
143 See Ghappour, supra note 104. 
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scholars disagreed, noting “the pervasive nature of transnational law 
enforcement cooperation generally and the existing practice of government 
cooperation and coordination in dark web investigations specifically,” and 
challenging the claim that the use of NITs in this context would violate 
international law.144 
 The law governing remote electronic searches is still in its infancy.  
Because Rule 41(b)(6) now provides venue for remote electronic searches, 
it has opened the courthouse door not only to applications seeking these 
warrants, but also to litigation challenging particular searches on 
constitutional grounds.  This litigation will allow the development of 
precedents that will clarify—and may limit—remote electronic searches.  
There may also be legislative developments.  Bills have been introduced in 
both houses to repeal the amendments to Rule 41,145 and Congress may 
eventually develop a framework to regulate remote electronic searches, as it 
did with wiretaps.146  The imposition of additional limits on remote searches 
could have a significant impact on the government’s ability to prosecute 
hacking, given the practical necessity to use remote searches to identify 
hackers. 
C. Jurisdiction to Prosecute Extraterritorial Conduct 
 If hacking originates outside the United States, it raises the question 
of whether the CFAA has extraterritorial reach.  Unlike some other federal 
statutes,147 the CFAA does not expressly confer jurisdiction over conduct 
that occurred outside the United States.  It is well established that the United 
States exercises jurisdiction to prescribe with respect to conduct that occurs 
within its territory,148 and U.S. statutes are presumed to apply in United 
                                                     
144 See Kerr & Murphy, supra note 101, at 61. 
145 Stop Mass Hacking Act, S. 406, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017); Stop Mass 
Hacking Act, H.R. 1110, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017). 
146 Cf. Minutes at 6 (comments of Prof. Beale) (noting that as in the case of Title II, 
Congress enacted limitations on wire taps after case law shed light on the policy 
issues). 
147 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1956(f) (providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over money 
laundering if the transactions involve more than $10,000 and the conduct is by a 
U.S. citizen or by a non-U.S. citizen in the United States); 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a) 
(providing extraterritorial jurisdiction over several trafficking offenses if the 
alleged offender is a national of the United States or a permanent resident alien, or 
“the alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality 
of the alleged offender.”) 
148 RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES: JURISDICTION § 201(1)(a), comment E (AM. LAW INST. Tentative Draft No. 
2, 2017) (approved May 22, 2017). See also Diane Marie Amann, Jurisdictional, 
Preliminary, and Procedural Concerns, AM SOC’Y INT’L L, www.asil.org/bench 
book/jurisdiction.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2017).  
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States territory.149  Although the U.S. also recognizes prescriptive 
extraterritorial jurisdiction based upon nationality, active and passive 
personality, the protective principle, and universal jurisdiction,150 the 
question whether a particular crime will have extraterritorial application 
must be determined by the courts. This determination is subject to a 
presumption in favor of domestic application of U.S. laws and against 
extraterritoriality.  In a series of recent decisions, the Supreme Court has 
reemphasized and strengthened the presumption against extraterritoriality, 
raising the question whether the CFAA will be construed to have 
extraterritorial effect. 
1. Statutory Construction and Extraterritoriality 
 In United States v. Bowman, a decision from 1922, the Supreme 
Court indicated that some offenses are not subject to the presumption 
against extraterritorial application. The Court recognized that crimes 
“affect[ing] the peace and good order of the community,” such as murder, 
robbery, and arson, are presumed to be territorial.151 Other crimes, however, 
are “not logically dependent on their locality for the government’s 
jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the government to 
defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated,” and they 
are not presumed to be territorial.152 In the intervening decades, that lower 
courts understood Bowman to mean “a substantial number of . . . crimes 
operate overseas by virtue of the implicit intent of Congress.”153   
 Recent decisions in the Supreme Court have tightened the rules of 
statutory interpretation, restricting access to the federal courts in civil cases 
involving extraterritorial conduct and casting doubt on the continuing 
vitality of Bowman.  In two major civil cases, Kiobel154 and Morrison155 the 
Court instructed the federal courts to apply a strong presumption against 
                                                     
149 Id.  
150 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 401 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1987); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF 
THE UNITED STATES: JURISDICTION § 101 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3, 
2017) (approved May 22, 2017).  
151 United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). 
152 Id. 
153 Charles Doyle, Cong. Research Serv., No. 94-166, Extraterritorial Application 
of American Criminal Law 19–20 (2016).  See also S. Nathan Williams, Note, The 
Sometimes “Craven Watchdog”: The Disparate Criminal-Civil Application of the 
Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 63 DUKE L.J. 1381, 1395 (2014) (stating 
“courts have found that some crimes are so inherently transnational as to deserve 
the blessing of the Bowman exception. Typical crimes in this . . . category include 
trafficking (human or drug) and racketeering.”). 
154 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124 (2013). 
155 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010). 
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extraterritoriality: absent a clearly expressed congressional intent to the 
contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic 
application.156 In justifying this presumption, the Court emphasized the need 
to avoid international discord157 or friction, as well as the “common sense” 
view that Congress ordinarily focuses on domestic matters.158  
 Although the Supreme Court has not expressly overruled Bowman, 
it is doubtful whether that case is still good law.  Initially, many courts and 
commentators concluded that Bowman had not been overruled or limited.159  
But the Court’s decision in a RJR Nabisco v. European Community,160 a 
civil suit brought under the Racketeering and Corrupt Organization (RICO) 
Act,161 cast serious doubt on the Supreme Court’s continued adherence to 
Bowman.  The Court first considered the question whether the criminal 
provisions of RICO itself (and various federal crimes that are RICO 
predicate offenses) have extraterritorial effect.162  The Court drew no 
distinction between civil and criminal statutes. In determining the reach of 
these offenses, the Court applied the presumption against exterritorial 
effect, citing its prior decisions in civil cases.163  It stated: 
The question is not whether we think “Congress would have wanted” a 
statute to apply to foreign conduct “if it had thought of the situation 
before the court,” but whether Congress has affirmatively and 
unmistakably instructed that the statute will do so.  When a statute 
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has 
none.”164 
The Court did not discuss or even cite the Bowman decision, but this 
passage can be read as repudiating the Bowman approach.  As one 
commentator stated, “the Court seemed to take direct aim at Bowman 
without naming it,”165 and the American Law Institute’s Restatement of 
Foreign Relations (Fourth) treats the presumption against extraterritoriality 
as fully applicable to criminal statutes.166 
                                                     
156 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117; Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261. 
157 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 117. 
158 RJR Nabisco v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2100 (2016). 
159 Doyle, supra note 153, at 10, n.45 (collecting cases). 
160 Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2093. 
161 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1970). 
162 Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2099–2106. 
163 Id. at 2100–01. 
164 Id. at 2100 (citations omitted). 
165 Doyle, supra note 153, at 10. 
166 See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: JURISDICTION § 203 reps. notes 1, 4 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 
3) (approved May 22, 2017) (describing evolution of presumption, drawing no 
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2. Construing the CFAA 
 The CFAA would be severely hamstrung if it were not applicable to 
foreign-based hacking, and there is some evidence that Congress intended 
the CFAA to have extraterritorial application.  But it is not clear whether the 
evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that Congress “clearly and 
unmistakably” directed that result.  Thus, the CFAA could provide the test 
case to determine whether the strong presumption developed in civil cases 
will be applied with the same rigor in construing criminal statutes, 
particularly those involving crimes that inherently cross borders.  The 
balance of interests may be calculated differently in civil and criminal cases, 
since the Executive Branch, which controls foreign relations, is also 
responsible for the discretionary determination whether to prosecute cases 
that may have foreign relations implications. 
 Only one district court has considered whether the CFAA provides 
for extraterritorial jurisdiction, and that decision predated the Supreme 
Court’s decision in RJR Nabisco.  In United States v. Ivanov167 the 
defendant, who was physically in Russia, hacked into the computer system 
of a financial-transaction clearinghouse using an internet service provider 
located in the state of Washington.  Noting the detrimental effect of the 
conduct occurred in the United States,168 the court concluded it had subject 
matter jurisdiction and turned to the question whether the CFAA provided 
for extraterritorial jurisdiction.  It recognized the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, but found that Congress “clearly manifested its intention” 
to give the CFAA extraterritorial effect.169  
 The Ivanov court focused on several changes made by Congress in 
1996.  Although the changes to the text focused on defining which 
computers were protected and what conduct was prohibited, the legislative 
history indicates the Senate was concerned about foreign-based hackers.  As 
the Ivanov court noted, the 1996 amendments revised the definition of 
“protected computer” to include a computer used in “foreign commerce or 
communication,” added subsections dealing with “interstate or foreign 
commerce,” and defined the term “government entity” to include foreign 
governments.170  Foreign commerce, in this context, “must mean 
international” commerce.171  The legislative history, moreover, suggests that 
Congress intended the CFAA to apply to foreign-based hackers.  As the 
court noted, the Senate Judiciary Committee “specifically noted its concern 
                                                                                                                       
distinction between civil and criminal or private and public enforcement, and 
concluding Bowman can be read to be consistent with more recent cases). 
167 United States v. Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 368–69 (D. Conn. 2001). 
168 Id. at 370–73. 
169 Id. at 373, 375. 
170 Id. at 374. 
171 Id.  
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that . . . hackers are often foreign-based,” and cited two specific instances of 
foreign-based hackers as examples of the kind of cases that the amendments 
were intended to address.172  
 Under the Supreme Court’s recent decisions on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, it is not clear whether other courts will follow Ivanov.  On the 
one hand, courts construing the CFAA will be well aware that construing it 
to apply only to conduct that occurs in the United States would severely 
limit its effectiveness.  However, it is doubtful whether a brief passage from 
a committee report constitutes an affirmative and unmistakable instruction 
that the CFAA should be applied to extraterritorial conduct, as well as to 
computers engaged in foreign commerce or and communication, including 
protected computers located outside the United States.173 Thus a challenge 
to the CFAA’s jurisdiction could provide a test for the criminal applicability 
of the most restrictive language in RJR Nabisco.174   
 Some scholars of international law have expressed concern that 
extraterritorial hacking prosecutions may violate international law,175 and 
those concerns might trigger the application of two other rules of statutory 
construction in CFAA prosecutions.  First, the federal courts apply the so-
called Charming Betsy principle that “an act of Congress ought never to be 
construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction 
remains.”176 This principle is applied, however, only when a construction 
avoiding such a conflict is “fairly possible.”177 But when such a 
                                                     
172 Id., citing S. Rep. No. 357, 104th Cong. (2d Sess. 1996). 
173 See also Doyle, supra note 153, at 6–7, 33–35 (noting the question whether 18 
U.S.C. 1030(a)(3), which criminalizes access to government computers, is 
applicable to extraterritorial conduct). 
174 One factor that might affect the courts’ response, at least at the margins, is a 
perception that concerns about interference with U.S. foreign relations should be 
less important in criminal than in civil cases.  Private civil claimants may neither 
know, nor care about, the possible diplomatic and foreign relations problems their 
case may generate.  In contrast, the Executive Branch has responsibility for both 
foreign affairs and the enforcement of criminal laws.  In cases involving the 
interests of other nations—such as the prosecution of foreign-based hackers—the 
Executive can weigh any foreign relations or foreign policy concerns in exercising 
prosecutorial discretion.  However, because the CFAA does create a private right of 
action for civil damages, any extraterritorial interpretation would apply to civil 
cases as well.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(g) (2012) (authorizing civil actions for 
“compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief). 
175 See, e.g., Stockton & Golabek-Goldman, supra note 95 (analyzing international 
law grounds for extraterritorial jurisdiction applied to cyberterrorism). 
176 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804).  
177 See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) THE LAW OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: JURISDICTION § 205 reps. notes 1, 4 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 
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construction is not fairly possible, the intent of Congress—rather than 
international law—governs, and “the federal statute is controlling as a 
matter of law.”178 The Supreme Court has also twice invoked the canon of 
“constru[ing] ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with 
the sovereign authority of other nations.”179 
D. Success Against the Odds 
  Despite the practical and legal difficulties, there have been some 
successful efforts to prosecute and disrupt hacking, the most recent of which 
involved the use of the Rule 41 amendments.   
 In April 2017, the Department of Justice announced “an extensive 
effort to disrupt and dismantle the Kelihos botnet,” which it described as “a 
global network of tens of thousands of infected computers under the control 
of a cybercriminal that was used to facilitate malicious activities including 
harvesting login credentials, distributing hundreds of millions of spam e-
mails, and installing ransomware and other malicious software.”180  
Pursuant to amended Rule 41, the Department of Justice had obtained a 
single warrant authorizing it to “redirect Kelihos-infected computers to a 
substitute server and to record the Internet Protocol addresses of those 
computers as they connect to the server.” 181  This allowed “the government 
to provide the IP addresses of Kelihos victims to those who can assist with 
removing the Kelihos malware including internet service providers.”182  
Some critics of the Rule 41 amendments were impressed that the 
government had been protective of individual privacy: it collected only the 
victims’ IP addresses and “non-content” routing and signaling information 
so Internet Service Providers could notify the victims. 183 Moreover, the 
court order “limited the government’s interactions with victimized 
computers to commands that block an infected computer from performing 
malicious activities and communicating with other devices on the botnets,” 
which prohibits the government from seizing any of the contents of victim 
                                                                                                                       
3) (approved, May 22, 2017); Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 114 (AM. LAW INST. 1987). 
178 Id.  
179  F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004). This 
canon has not, however, been invoked by the Court since its 2007 holding in 
Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007). 
180 Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Announces Actions to Dismantle Kelihos 
Botnet, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
pr/justice-department-announces-actions-dismantle-kelihos-botnet-0. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Aliya Sternstein, FBI Allays Some Critics with First Use of New Mass-Hacking 
Warrant, ARSTECHNICA (Apr. 24, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/ 
04/fbi-allays-some-critics-with-first-use-of-new-mass-hacking-warrant/. 
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computers.184  But other commentators were critical of the government’s 
efforts because they involved invading the victim computers to take 
corrective actions.185  To permanently disable the Kelihos botnet, the 
government had to prevent the victim computers from communicating with 
other hacker-controlled devices.186 
 The government also collected sufficient information to attribute 
the Kelihos botnet to Russian hacker Peter Yuryevish Levashov, who was 
indicted for CFAA violations and other related charges.187  In an ironic twist 
of fate, government investigators finally linked Levashov to the botnet 
because he had committed the same security lapse that allows 
cybercriminals to victimize innocent consumers: using the same IP and 
login credentials on various consumer sites, including Apple and Google.188  
With the cooperation of Spanish authorities, Levashov was arrested in Spain 
while on holiday, the National Court of Spain ruled that he could be 
extradited, and he was brought to the United States in February 2018.189 
V. LEGALIZING HACKING BACK AGAINST BOTNETS 
 Although the CFAA provides a tool to prosecute hacking in the IoT, 
given the difficulties implicit in bringing prosecutions under it, other 
solutions are needed to address the dangers posed by the IoT.  This section 
discusses one such possible solution: remedial action.190 Although 
                                                     
184 Id. 
185 See, e.g., Tim Cushing, FBI Tries New Rule 41 Changes on Size in Fight Against 
Long-Running Botnet for Size, TECHDIRT (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.tech 
dirt.com/articles/20170411/09411837126/fbi-tries-new-rule-41-changes-size-fight-
against-long-running-botnet.shtml. 
186 See Sternstein, supra note 183 (quoting security expert involved in Kelihos 
cleanup who explained that because of the peer-to-peer nature of this botnet, “the 
FBI ‘had to infect machines,’ convert them into so-called supernodes that distribute 
connection lists to other victimized computers, and then ‘poison’ all the computers 
so they would never again try to communicate with hacker-controlled devices”). 
187 Garrett M. Graff, How the FBI Took Down Russia’s Spam King, WIRED (Apr. 
11, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/04/fbi-took-russias-spam-king-massive-
botnet/. 
188 Id. 
189 See Andrew Blake, Foreign Courts OK Extradition of Russians Charged in U.S. 
Cybercrime Probes, WASH. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.washington 
times.com/news/2017/oct/4/peter-levashov-and-alexander-vinnik-russians-charg/ 
(describing Spanish court’s approval of extradition to the United States); U.S. 
Department of Justice, Alleged Operator of Kelihos Botnet Extradited From Spain, 
Feb. 2, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/alleged-operator-kelihos-botnet-
extradited-spain. 
190 We use the term “hacking back” to refer to invasive counterattacks.  We use the 
term “remedial action” to denote the broader category of self-help measures which 
hacking back is a part of. 
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remedial actions might sometimes be useful when hackers seek to control 
an object as discussed in Section III.A., we will focus here on their potential 
to reduce the threat posed by botnets, where such efforts would have the 
greatest utility.  It is a controversial route, mired in legal, ethical, and 
practical dilemmas.  This section begins by discussing the danger of 
botnets, the potential benefit of hacking back, and the legal barriers to doing 
so.  It then assesses how hacking back may be legalized, before 
summarizing some of its primary critiques. 
A. The Danger of Botnets and the Allure of Hacking Back 
 The Botnets have a different relationship to the IoT than many of 
the other dangers discussed in this article.  Much of this article focuses on 
how the internet may be used to corrupt devices connected to it.191  In 
contrast, botnets present the reverse issue: devices connected to the internet 
may be used to disrupt the internet itself.192  Compounding the problem, 
botnets are not only an existential threat to the internet but a persistent one 
as well.  Without curative solutions, botnets can be used in multiple 
crimes.193  Once a device is recruited into a botnet, it becomes part of a 
“commodity” that can be rented out “by the hour” or purchased.194   
 Thus, to eliminate the threat of botnets, a solution with retroactive 
and curative force is needed.  Enter hacking back, part of a larger concept of 
internet self help or remediation encompassing terms such as counterstrikes, 
“‘active defense,’ ‘back hacking,’ ‘retaliatory hacking,’ or ‘offensive 
countermeasures’”195  As the assorted terms suggest, remedial action 
encompasses a range of different self-help measures to prevent and counter 
botnets and hacking. Remedial actions might “enable attacked parties to 
detect, trace, and then actively respond to a threat by, for example, 
interrupting an attack in progress to mitigate damage to the system.”196  
Specific strategies could include implementing a “DoS attack at the botnet 
controller or hacking the botnet controller and thereby taking control of the 
botnet.”197  However, not all remedial efforts are so forceful: “Hacking back 
                                                     
191 See discussion supra Section I.A.  
192 See supra notes 11–19 and accompanying text (describing the role of botnets in 
the Dyn attack which disrupted several leading websites). 
193 One illustration of the resilience of botnets can be found in Microsoft and 
Europol’s attempt to dismantle the ZeroAccess botnet: despite taking down portions 
of the botnet it was revived within months.  Goldman, supra note 86, at 610. 
194 Janine S. Hiller, Civil Cyberconflict: Microsoft, Cybercrime, and Botnets, 31 
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 163, 168–69 (2015). 
195 Sean L. Harrington, Cyber Security Active Defense: Playing with Fire or Sound 
Risk Management?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12, at *4 (2014). See Kesan, supra note 
60, at 434 (using the terms “hack back” and “counterstrike”).   
196 Id. at 475. 
197 Id. 
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against a botnet can be as simple and nonaggressive as pushing security 
patches onto infected computers, just as patients with a deadly virus could 
be forcibly treated or quarantined to prevent a contagion’s spread.”198  
Unlike enforcement and litigation which do little to prevent future attacks, 
and are “inherently ex post facto,”199 hacking back has the crucial ability to 
prevent future attacks by combatting existing botnets.  
 Despite these potential benefits, there is also a potential problem. At 
least if undertaken by private parties,200 such behaviors may be illegal.201  
Ironically, “[t]he same laws that make it illegal to hack in the first place—
for instance, to access someone else’s system without authorization—
presumably make it illegal to hack back.”202  The CFAA both criminalizes 
botnets and limits recourse against them.203  The Department of Justice, the 
FBI, and “White House officials” have all suggested that such remedial 
efforts may be illegal.204  Scholarship echoes this conclusion.205  As a result, 
the legal regime that is intended to protect the public from hacking also 
limits the manner in which such dangers may be fought.  A logical question 
then, is how hacking back might be legalized.206 
B. Possible Theories for the Legalization of Hacking Back 
 There are a variety of ways in which hacking back might be 
legalized.  This subsection focuses primarily on one possibility: creating 
exceptions for strikebacks through a legal framework modeled on the laws 
governing recapture of property.  It then briefly summarizes other 
possibilities.  
 Recapture laws provide a promising framework for remedial action.  
They balance two conflicting considerations implicated by hacking back: 
the right to protect personal property, and the understanding that that right 
cannot be absolute.  On the one hand, “[t]he law has always recognized that 
a person is justified in using some degree of force to protect his property 
                                                     
198 Patrick Lin, Ethics of Hacking Back, U.S. NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (Sept. 26, 2016), 
http://ethics.calpoly.edu/hackingback.pdf. 
199 See Kesan, supra note 60, at 474. 
200 For a discussion of the government’s use of remedial measures to neutralize the 
Kelihos botnet, see supra notes 174–80 and accompanying text. 
201 See Kesan, supra note 60, at 475 (“Even though counterstrikes are currently of 
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205 See Harrington, supra note 195, at *17 (“[T]here is little debate that affirmative 
retaliatory hacking is unlawful . . .”). 
206 Some less aggressive remedial actions may be legal. Although a full review is 
beyond the scope of this paper, for a summary, see id. at *9–*16. 
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from wrongful invasion or appropriation by another.”207 On the other, the 
law has been wary of the dangers surrounding self-help measures to regain 
property.208 
 The Model Penal Code (MPC) provides an important compromise 
of these conflicting interests in the context of recaption of property.  Under 
MPC 3.06(1)(b), “use of force upon or toward the person of another” when 
protecting property is justifiable if: 
[T]he actor believes that such force is immediately necessary . . . to 
effect an entry or re-entry upon land or to retake tangible movable 
property provided that the actor believes that he or the person by 
whose authority he acts or a person from whom he or such other 
person derives title was unlawfully dispossessed of such land or 
movable property and is entitled to possession, and provided, further, 
that:  
(i) the force is used immediately or on fresh pursuit after such 
dispossession; or  
(ii) the actor believes that the person against whom he uses force 
has no claim of right to the possession of the property and, in the 
case of land, the circumstances, as the actor believes them to be, 
are of such urgency that it would be an exceptional hardship to 
postpone the entry or re-entry until a court order is obtained.209   
Although closely related to the use of force to protect property, recaption is 
separate in the Model Penal Code.210 
 This separate right of recaption provides a useful template for laws 
governing hacking back, although further analogy is necessary. Returning to 
the example of Bill and Jeremy, imagine that Jeremy steals some of Bill’s 
                                                     
207 The Use of Deadly Force in the Protection of Property Under the Model Penal 
Code, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 1212 (1959). 
208 See MODEL PENAL CODE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.06 comment 
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[The purpose of the traditional Statute of Forcible Entry governing recapture of 
land was to] “require parties to submit disputes to the courts, and thus to prevent 
breaches of the peace.”   
209 MODEL PENAL CODE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.06(1)(b) (AM. 
LAW INST. 1985). 
210 See MODEL PENAL CODE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.06 comment 
5(e) (AM. LAW INST. 1985) (explaining that the Model Penal Code distinguishes 
between “rules for the use of protective force and the rules for re-entry and 
recaption . . . .”). 
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personal possessions.  Applying the test of MPC 3.06, it could be justifiable 
for Bill to take back his personal property if he believed it “immediately 
necessary.”  Jeremy’s initial interference with Bill’s property rights justifies 
some resulting intrusion by Bill into Jeremy’s rights.  
 To illustrate how the framework of MPC 3.06 could shape laws 
governing hacking back, imagine the digital equivalent.  Assume that Bill 
operates a thriving retail and manufacturing business out of his home 
comprised of a computer, a website, and an internet enabled 3D printer. 
Jeremy hacks into Bill’s computer and steals consumer credit card 
information stored on it, saving it to his hard drive.  Jeremy also controls a 
sizeable botnet through his personal computer and directs it to launch a 
DDoS attack on Bill’s website, bringing it down.  Finally, Jeremy exploits 
the botnet to gain control of Bill’s 3D printer and causes it to malfunction.  
The basic scenario is the same as in the hypothetical above: Jeremy has 
interfered with Bill’s property.  Only the nature of the intrusion is different.  
Bill still has physical possession of his computer and printer, but Jeremy has 
wrongfully copied some files, and taken control of the printer.  If MPC 3.06 
were the framework for hacking back laws, Bill might be able to hack back 
to erase the stolen files, end the DDoS attack, and regain control of his 
printer.  It is analogous to Bill taking back his physical property above. The 
basic premise is the same: Jeremy’s meddling with Bill’s property merits 
some form of response to restore Bill’s property interests. 
 Of course, there is a fundamental threshold difference between 
recaption as envisioned by MPC 3.06, and hacking back of the sort 
contemplated in the Bill and Jeremy example.  The MPC right of recaption 
is not directly relevant to hacking back. It provides a justification for the use 
of non-deadly force against the person of another, rather than for 
interference with property, such as a computer within the meaning of the 
CFAA.  Except for the general defense of “choice of evils,” the MPC does 
not address the justification for interference with property.211  However, the 
law generally regards any use of force against a person as a more serious 
wrong than interference with personal property. Therefore, the framework 
for recaption in MPC 3.06 should be sufficient, as a policy matter, to justify 
the lesser wrong of interference with personal property.   
 Such interference already has a close analogy in the context of torts.  
Although tort law does not permit the use of force for recapture of chattels 
“once possession is clearly lost,” it “permits a defendant who is entitled to 
immediate possession to recover the goods from another’s land (a) if the 
defendant did not cause the intrusion of the goods in the first place and (b) 
                                                     
211 See MODEL PENAL CODE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.02 (AM. LAW 
INST. 1985). 
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if entry is reasonable as to both time and manner.”212 For example, “[i]t is 
not disputed that if . . . [chattels belonging to another] have come upon the 
land through the wrongful conduct of the landowner, a privilege to enter 
and recover them exists.”213  In exercising that privilege, “[r]easonable 
amounts of damage may be done, even to the extent of breaking down a 
fence or a door . . . The privilege is complete, and, so long as only 
reasonable force is used, the defendant is not liable for any damage he may 
do.”214  In some circumstances a person may use force against the physical 
property of someone who has taken his own property, in the attempt to 
recapture it.  This is particularly instructive in the context of hacking back, 
because breaking down a thief’s door to regain stolen property is similar to 
hacking back against a digital aggressor to restore a compromised 
computer. 
 Allowing for some leeway regarding where force may be directed 
in recapturing property, the conceptual underpinning of MPC 3.06 fits well 
with the basic nature of remedial action in the IoT.  Reworking is necessary 
to accommodate the differences between the physical and digital arenas, 
because they result in somewhat distinct property interests and methods of 
recaption.  A rudimentary sketch of a law governing counterstrikes may be 
imagined by modifying MPC 3.06(1)(b) to rectify these disparities and to 
clarify that force may be used against the property of another: 
Damage to, intrusion into, or interference with, the computer of 
another . . . is justifiable when protecting property . . .  if the actor 
believes that such action is immediately necessary . . . to regain control 
of a computer, website, digital information, or computer enabled 
device, provided that the actor [reasonably]215 believes that he or the 
person by whose authority he acts . . . was unlawfully deprived of 
control of such computer, website, digital information, or computer 
enabled device . . . and is entitled to regain control, and provided, 
further, that:  
(i) the action is used immediately after such interference with 
control; or  
                                                     
212 Dan B. Dobbs et al., THE LAW OF TORTS § 91, at 275, 278 (2d ed. 2011). 
213 W. Page Keeton et al., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 22, at 
139 (5th ed. 1984). 
214 Id. at 140. 
215 It would be important to consider whether to qualify a defense based on 3.06 
with the requirement that the defendant’s beliefs be reasonable.  M.P.C. Section 
3.06 focuses solely on the defendant’s subjective belief.  But it is qualified by 
Section 3.09(2), which makes the defense unavailable for certain offenses if the 
defendant was reckless or negligent in having a belief required for 3.06 or other 
justification defenses.  See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES, §3.09 
comment 2 (AM. LAW INST. 1985). 
195                 HACKING THE INTERNET OF THINGS  [Vol. 16 
 
(ii) the actor believes that the person against whom he takes this 
action has no claim of right to the interference with control of the 
computer, website, digital information, or computer enabled 
device . . . .” 
This formulation is intended as merely a rough illustration of how the 
template of recaption law might apply to hacking back, and to further paint 
the analogy between recapture of physical property and remedial action in 
the IoT.  A comprehensive statute is well beyond the scope of this paper.  
Nevertheless, an additional consideration demands attention. 
 MPC 3.06 contains temporal limitations that could greatly hinder an 
analogous right to hack back.  MPC 3.06(1)(b) demands immediacy, 
requiring a belief of “immediate” necessity, and actions that are “used 
immediately or on fresh pursuit after such dispossession.”216  These 
requirements may be impractical in the context of an attack in the IoT 
because it may be impossible to quickly assess the harm and identify the 
perpetrator.217  State laws modifying MPC 3.06 provide models for a more 
flexible timing requirement.  For example, Connecticut allows force for the 
recapture of personal property “when and to the extent that [the recapturer] 
reasonably believes such to be necessary . . . to regain property which he 
reasonably believes to have been acquired by larceny within a reasonable 
time prior to the use of such force.”218  Extending the window in which the 
victim of a botnet attack may respond from immediacy to reasonableness, as 
Connecticut does for recaption, could better accommodate a range of 
remedial actions.   
 With these modifications to recapture law framework, more 
aggressive forms of hacking back might be legally permissible. Of course, 
creating a right of reentry or recapture based on the MPC is just one way 
that hacking back might be legalized.  Other routes have been suggested.  
For example, one proposal would amend the CFAA to allow a limited self-
help privilege narrowly cabined by four requirements: 
(1) the counterattack must be necessary and proportional to the threat 
being mitigated or prevented; (2) the counterattack must be in response 
to an ongoing or repeated attack; (3) the counterattacker must submit a 
good-faith justification and notification to the government; and (4) the 
counterattacker must assume strict liability for all damage to third 
                                                     
216 Id.  We omitted the MPC language about “fresh pursuit” from our model statute 
because we are unaware of a digital equivalent for the concept.   
217 See Lin, supra note 198, at 15 (observing that quick attribution is inaccurate, and 
accurate attribution is slow). 
218 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-21 (1969).   
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parties, and liability for all negligently caused unnecessary damage to 
the original attacker. 219 
Amending the CFAA has some proponents in Congress.  Indeed,  
Georgia representative Tom Graves proposed the Active Cyber 
Defense Certainty Act (ACDC), which would change the CFAA so 
that it would not apply to victims of cyberattacks who accessed 
attackers’ networks to “gather information in order to establish 
attribution of criminal activity to share with law enforcement” or to 
“disrupt continued unauthorized activity against the victim’s own 
network.”220   
Others propose a path for legalizing remedial action through analogy to 
retail security guards,221 bounty hunters, or private investigators.222  Under 
these theories, remedial actions like planting malware in botnets or 
searching the networks of invaders could be “considered seizure of an 
offensive weapon” or security patrols, respectively.  Other theories have 
looked to tort law exceptions such as private nuisance, trespass to 
chattels,223 “the recapture of chattels privilege,
 
entry upon land to remove 
chattels,
 
private necessity,
 
or even the castle doctrine.”224 But even if 
legalizing hacking back under any of these theories would be possible, it is 
not necessarily a good idea. The next subsection explores the pitfalls. 
C. The Ethical and Logistical Problems with Hacking Back 
 Hacking back has garnered considerable attention in the wake of 
prominent hacks,225 but the attention has not all been positive.226  Critics 
have highlighted a range of logistical and ethical issues. Logistically, it is 
                                                     
219 Shane Huang, Proposing a Self-Help Privilege for Victims of Cyber Attacks, 82 
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222 See Wolff, supra note 220 (interviewing Stewart Baker). 
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224 Harrington, supra note 195, at 23–24.  Indeed, the Restatement Second of Torts 
has many provisions which could be applicable to hacking back, but are beyond the 
scope of this criminal law-focused article.  See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS §§ 100–110 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 17, 1974); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 197–201, 213–215 (AM. LAW INST., 1965). 
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unclear that hacking back would be an effective solution even if legalized.  
One major logistical concern is the danger of escalation.  Hacking back may 
create new attacks rather than end ongoing ones.227  Two considerations 
magnify this danger.  First, not all hackers will be deterred by remedial 
action.228  Some, such as hacktivists, may welcome the challenge and ramp 
up their attacks.229  Alternatively, where the initial aggressor is a foreign 
government or criminal organization, escalated retaliation is likely.230  
American companies engaged in hack backs against such actors will not be 
able to out-violate the law.231  Second, companies are not as well-equipped 
as the government to assess the likelihood of foreign escalation.232  
Disturbingly, a company’s remedial action could be perceived by a foreign 
country as “a military response from our state.”233  Remedial action from an 
American company could become “the opening volleys of a cyberwar, 
which could escalate into a physical or kinetic war.”234  
 Another major logistical concern focuses on the danger that 
remedial actions could create chaos in the wake of hacks.  Some in law 
enforcement warn that remedial action could “lead to confusion in 
investigating cyberattacks.”235  Remedial action looks similar to the tools 
used by the initial aggressors, and makes it “much harder to distinguish 
between the good guys and the bad guys online.”236  And remedial action 
could also muddle the judicial recourse for cyberattacks because evidence 
gained through hacking back may be inadmissible for those bringing suit 
under the CFAA.237   
 One last logistical criticism of remedial action is rooted in the 
relationship between companies and the cybersecurity firms they may 
contract with to provide remedial action.  Cybersecurity firms are given 
access to corporate networks and are in the ideal position to steal 
information from the companies that hired them.238  Even if outright theft by 
cybersecurity firms is unlikely, there is a perverse incentive.  As one article 
phrased the relationship: “Would there not be a conflict of interest . . . 
                                                     
227 Id. (Security experts are concerned that hacking back could become a “vehicle 
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between treating a problem (ongoing revenue for your security firm) and 
curing it (which ends their engagement)?”239   
 The ethical critiques of remedial action are similarly varied.  One 
focuses on the relationship between private and public that hacking back 
might fuel.  For example, remedial action intrudes on the domain of force 
against foreign actors that generally belongs to the state.240  Alternatively, 
remedial action by private companies presents a danger of government 
ratification of illegal behavior as in Russia, which is said to rely on 
“intelligence gathered by criminals, allowing it to benefit from crimes 
without accepting responsibility for them.”241  
 Other ethical concerns abound.  For example, information security 
professionals that engage in remedial actions may actually violate the 
professional code of their licensing agency.242  Additionally, even if hacking 
back were to be legalized under U.S. law, it might still “violate foreign 
laws.”243  Finally, some distinguish hacking back from self-defense because 
unlike self-defense, the justifying threat is not existential.244 
 One last major criticism involves both logistical and ethical 
dilemmas.  For hacking back to work, the entity doing it must be able to 
identify the perpetrator of the hack.  As discussed more fully in Section 
IV.A., identifying hackers is difficult because they “‘like to cover their 
tracks by routing attacks through other people’s computers, without the 
owners’ knowledge.”245  As a result, remedial action is hampered by time 
and certainty.246  Quick remedial actions are likely to be uncertain and could 
be against the wrong party, while accurate attribution is likely to be too 
slow to be to allow for effective remediation.247  Ethically, this presents two 
major problems.  First, remedial actions risk collateral damage to innocent 
parties.  Second, the limitations on attribution temper the justification of 
remedial action as self-defense.  Using force against a cyber aggressor is 
one thing, using it against a victim is another.  
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  When applied to a hypothetical, many of these logistical and ethical 
critiques are damning.  Return one last time to the example of Jeremy’s 
hack.  In using Bill and Jeremy to illustrate how recapture of property law 
might provide a framework for the legalization of hacking back, it was 
necessary to analogize between the physical world and the digital world as 
so many accounts of hacking do.248  But many of the ethical and logistical 
critiques of remedial action illustrate that such analogies are imperfect, even 
if plausible.  For example, in the Jeremy and Bill example, Bill was able to 
attribute the attack to Jeremy.  That degree of certainty is unlikely in reality, 
and especially within a short period of time.  Second, the hypothetical 
presented Jeremy and Bill as sharing physical proximity.  In the digital age 
a hacker may be far away, often in another country.  The hacker may even 
be the agent of a foreign government.  By hacking back against Jeremy, Bill 
may have waded into the waters of international aggression and escalation.  
Alternatively, Jeremy could be an innocent party whose network has been 
compromised by someone else.  He might then mistake Bill’s defensive 
hack back for an initial aggression, and respond with a new attack.  Of 
course, it is unlikely that both parties would be individuals.  They could be 
corporations, governments, criminal organizations, or teams.  Perhaps that 
is most indicative of the core problem: the uncertainty inherent in 
cyberattacks and the IoT makes solutions simultaneously essential but 
difficult. 
VI. OTHER OPTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE SECURITY OF THE IOT 
 If remedial actions like hacking back cannot remedy the numerous 
and grave threats that permeate the era of the IoT, and the CFAA is 
insufficient, then it is essential to find another way to reduce vulnerabilities 
and prevent attacks. Although there are many possibilities,249 this section 
briefly explores two possible prospective solutions: (1) a standards 
approach; and (2) agency regulation.   
 Both solutions differ from remedial actions such as hacking back by 
focusing more on securing new IoT devices rather than combatting existing 
ones that have already been corrupted.  Both solutions are grounded in the 
same understanding of the problems with the IoT. Proponents of a standards 
approach and agency regulation often view the IoT as a victim of a market 
failure, as Section II illustrates.250 Consumers want IoT devices to be as 
                                                     
248 See, e.g., Huang, supra note 219, at 1241–45 (describing attempts to 
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cheap as possible.251  Manufacturers and retailers oblige, prioritizing cost 
over security because they have no incentive not to.252  International supply 
chains and the limited security expertise of many IoT design teams further 
complicate matters.253  The widespread weaknesses in IoT devices offer an 
enticing tool and opportunity for nefarious activity.  This section evaluates 
the potential of a standards approach or agency regulation to break this 
cycle. 
A. The Standards Approach 
  Vulnerabilities like default passwords and static firmware threaten 
IoT security.  Although they are suboptimal, because there is no uniform set 
of standards that IoT manufacturers or retailers must meet they are not 
technically substandard.254  The standards approach would attempt to 
remedy this by imposing such a system on key players. 
 A standards system would combat the market failure by 
incentivizing better security practices in the proliferation of IoT devices.255  
According to one expert, adopting “defined standards” will “change buying 
and investment patterns” that are responsible for the current state of 
vulnerability in the IoT.256  Imposing stronger security measures through 
standards for IoT developers is important because “[s]ecurity needs to be 
built into IoT devices, not bolted on.  If cybersecurity is not part of the early 
design of an IoT device, it’s too late for effective risk control.”257  
Establishing standards that require better security measures from the start 
implicates “domestic and international” standards setting entities like the 
International Standards Organization (ISO) or the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST),258 and may require government 
intervention.259  
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 Generally, organizations advocating for the use of a standards-
based approach emphasize the importance of a consistent and uniform 
standard,260 but the priorities of an IoT security standard might vary.  For 
example, Dale Drew—a proponent of a standards approach—is preoccupied 
with remedying vulnerabilities like default passwords, “hard-coded 
credentials,” and the “lack of capability of updating [IoT device] 
firmware.”261   
 One bipartisan legislative attempt at employing a standards 
approach, titled “The Internet of Things Cybersecurity Act of 2017,” is 
currently pending before Congress.262  The Bill would apply to IoT devices 
sold to the federal government, and “requires that manufacturers that sell 
smart devices to government agencies regularly patch their products for 
vulnerabilities and steer clear from using hard-coded passwords to access 
the devices via a backdoor.”263  
 Assuming arguendo that agreement could be reached on the correct 
standards, this approach would still have a serious limitation: it would not 
affect the millions of existing devices. 
B. Agency Regulation 
 Some experts have concluded that the pervasive threats to the IoT, 
and the related market failure, require increased government 
involvement.264  They argue that “[c]ybersecurity ought to be a public good 
much like automobile safety.”265   
 One possibility is to expand the capabilities of existing government 
agencies to test IoT security.  To promote automobile safety, there are 
federally funded research and development centers, testing facilities run by 
the National Transportation Safety Board (post market), automotive crash 
safety testing (premarket), and the Nevada National Security Site 
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(destruction and survivability testing).266 But no analogous regulatory 
entities or research facilities currently exist to provide a proving ground for 
embedded cybersecurity defenses needed by IoT.267  Such facilities would 
remedy the government’s lack of a means to “conduct thorough security 
testing and assessment on IoT devices” and would reduce the inefficiencies 
of having diffuse entities conducting independent research.268  This 
expansion could potentially fall under the control of the National Science 
Foundation or the NIST.269 
 Another possibility is the creation of a new regulatory agency.  
Bruce Schneier advocates for this position and analogizes the IoT to the 
once-new technologies of the past that gave rise to new agencies: “trains, 
cars, airplanes, radio, and nuclear power.”270  He argues that “[i]n the world 
of dangerous things, we constrain innovation,”271 and that the IoT presents 
new dangers just as those earlier technologies did during their development.  
As a result, even if regulation would stifle some creativity, Schneier 
suggests that this is a necessary sacrifice for security.272  Furthermore, the 
IoT presents problems that the market cannot or will not solve on its own.  
The most prominent is the market failure and the lack of consumer and 
manufacturer incentives to resolve technological vulnerabilities in the 
IoT.273  Schneier argues that—as with environmental pollution—regulation 
is essential because the dangers and ill effects are felt only downstream.274 
 In the current political environment, which favors smaller 
government and reducing regulation, it seems doubtful that this approach 
could get traction in Congress. And if it did so, recruiting the necessary 
expertise and resources could be a daunting task. 
CONCLUSION 
 The dangers in the IoT are complex, multifaceted, and numerous; 
and none of the possible solutions discussed in this article is wholly 
satisfying.  For example, the current legal regime under the CFAA governs 
many of the threats in the IoT, and there have been some successful 
prosecutions under it.  However, the CFAA’s utility is severely limited by 
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practical and jurisdictional concerns, and it also prohibits some remedial 
actions against hacking.  Similar contradictions are apparent with the 
alternative solutions evaluated in this article.  Remedial actions like hacking 
back could ameliorate the perils of botnets, but they suffer from legal, 
ethical, and practical drawbacks.  A standards approach might help secure 
the IoT prospectively, but it does nothing to eliminate the threat posed by 
preexisting botnets and compromised IoT devices.  Agency regulation 
might provide similar relief, but seems unlikely in the current political 
climate. 
 Given these obstacles, it is tempting to do nothing, despite the 
overwhelming and quickly accelerating dangers posed by the IoT.  That 
would be the worst option of all.  First, an absence of official action should 
not be mistaken for an absence of action.  If the government does not act to 
secure the IoT, others will, and the results could be chaotic and perilous.  
This inevitability may already be occurring: self-appointed vigilante “white 
hat” hackers are suspected in the proliferation of three botnets.  One, known 
as Hajime, “has infected at least 10,000 home routers, network-connected 
cameras, and other so-called Internet of Things devices” with the apparent 
goal of “disrupt[ing] Mirai and similar IoT botnets.”275  Even assuming that 
the vigilante hackers have good intentions, their solution is fleeting, the 
methodology is illegal, and it interferes with “tens of thousands of devices” 
without the permission of their owners.276  The other botnets, known as 
“BrickerBot.1” and “BrickerBot.2” may have a similar goal, but are 
particularly destructive: they are “designed to damage routers and other 
Internet-connected appliances so badly that they become effectively 
inoperable.”277  If these developments are any indication, without official 
intervention, the fight to secure the IoT could become a war of attrition with 
many innocent victims. 
 Second, the extraordinary growth of the IoT and its extreme 
vulnerability threaten individuals, businesses, and the broader society.  
Insecure IoT devices may be corrupted and exploited to attack the internet 
itself, threatening our reliance on the internet for things such as finance, 
news, healthcare, education, communication, information storage, and 
more.278  Alternatively, IoT devices present new and unique opportunities 
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for malicious actors to turn digital hacking into physical consequences.279  
Hackers can already jeopardize a frightening array of internet-enabled 
objects including cars, trains, voting machines, power plants, dams, home 
thermostats, implanted medical devices, and possibly airplanes.280 With 
ever-increasing internet connectivity, the perils could implicate any device 
that is connected to the internet.  In the face of these potentially crippling 
threats, action is essential.  If we wait passively for the full array of dangers 
of the IoT to become a reality, the wait will not be long, and the crisis could 
be severe. 
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